- Server-side signals, not trusted scripts
- The server scores what it knows about the connection: the network it comes from, whether it is a hosting range or Tor, how fast requests arrive, and signs that a browser is automated. Signals can only lower the score, never raise it.
- The browser does work before it is believed
- Every visitor runs a small proof-of-work challenge in the browser, with a hidden check that it ran in a real page. It is cheap once and expensive at bot volume, and it is harder for hosting networks and Tor.
- Single-use, short-lived pass tokens
- A pass is a signed token that lives two minutes and is burned the first time your server verifies it. Replay the same token and the answer is timeout-or-duplicate, in every region.
- Drop-in for code you already wrote
- The verification call takes a secret and a response and answers with success, score, level_reached, hostname, challenge_ts and error-codes. Existing backend code usually only needs its URL changed.
- Origin-side enforcement, no extra edge
- Armed targets are enforced by the Xuda router itself. A cleared visitor carries an httpOnly, secure, SameSite=Lax cookie for the clearance window, so the interstitial is a one-time event, not a toll booth.
- Flood control and a silent honeypot
- 60 verification attempts a minute per visitor IP and site key, 600 a minute per site key. A decoy field that gets filled fails the visitor with a deliberately uninformative reason, so the bot learns nothing from the rejection.